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THE SPECIAL AIR TRANSPORT CONFERENCE
OF ICAO
April 1977: A new basis for the trade in traffic rights
for international air services?
DR. H. A. WASSENBERGH*

N HIS comprehensive and amply-documented article "Bermuda
revisited", Mr. Barry Diamond concludes, inter alia, that the Bermuda Agreement is immutably the best approach available to the
United States, "if the bilateral partners of the United States operate
according to the rule which the United States and the United Kingdom drafted at Bermuda."' This is probably true and not only for
the United States but for international civil aviation in general.
Unfortunately, also for the United States, the original Bermuda
principles are no longer applied in most bilateral air relationships.
For the United States to complain, however, does not seem fully
justified in all cases, as it is not always the other partner to the
United States bilateral Bermuda-type agreements who departs from
these principles: the United States itself does not uphold the original
principles without respect of countries, but does deviate from them
incases other than in retaliation against restrictions imposed on
United States carriers' operations in violation of the Bermuda
principles.'
Now, of course, the issue is not which principles for a regulatory
* Dr. Wassenbergh, a noted authority on international aviation law, has recently completed his third book "Public International Air Transportation Law
in a New Era." He is associated with KLM Royal Dutch Airlines; but the views
expressed herein are his own.
See Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past,
Present and Future of Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 41 J. AnR L. & COM.
419 (1975).
2Id.
at 491.
sCf. US-Netherlands and US-Scandinavia air negotiations 1974/1975. See
Lowenfeld, CAB v. KLM; Bermuda at Bay, 1 AIR LAw 2 (1975); Wassenbergh,
Public International Law in a New Era, 2 AIR LAw (1976).
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regime of international air carriers' operation will be the most advantageous for the United States or any other particular State for
that matter." The objective in trying to draft such principles, clearly,
should be the sound development of the international air services
system as a whole, as it is being built up by the air services of the
air carriers of all states together. In my writings cited by Mr. Diamond, I have advocated a regulatory system based primarily upon
economic considerations of fair competition, carrier efficiency and
the acceptance by the public of the services offered. In other words,
a regulatory system allowing for the forces of the market place to
determine the quantity and quality of the services offered, while
taking into account the pecularities of the airline industry, is the
desired result. This, in turn, calls for a certain amount of price
regulation in the public interest to ensure honest competition in
the international field.' According to Mr. Diamond, however, my
criticism of restrictions based upon the wish to protect one's "own"
air traffic market in order to reserve as much as possible the carriage of a state's "own" traffic to its national air carrier(s), should
be disregarded for the reason of "what might be called a conflict of
interest, based on the self-interest of the Netherlands and KLM.'"
Mr. Diamond argues that:
Small countries, of course, are not at all upset by any pejorative
notions of restrictionism put forward by the major air powers.
Their primary concern is to protect their own national airlines,
which, they correctly feel, will be under a competitive disadvantage
in the absence of restrictions."
The Netherlands happens to be a small country, although KLM
may be a major airline. The Netherlands, traditionally, follows a
liberal aviation policy and KLM has never felt at a competitive
disadvantage in the absence of restrictions unilaterally imposed
4 The new International Air Transportation Policy of the United States, approved by President Ford on Sept. 8, 1976, is a well thought-out statement and
contains a great number of commendable policy issues. On the whole, however,
it is a "fighting document" to primarily advance the interests of the United States'
international carriers.
I Cf. the new United States Policy Statement: "However, fundamental restraints limit the operation of free competition in international air services."

(p.2 1).

'Diamond, supra note 1, at 470.
T
Id. at 470.
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upon foreign air carriers by the Netherland's authorities.' Mr.
Diamond's reproach of self-interest in my advocating a "liberal"
system of economic international air transportation regulation,
therefore, cannot be based on his arguments. His rebuke, however,
could be based on my confidence that KLM and any other efficient
national air carrier, under a liberal regime of honest competition
will be able to remain competitive and thereby serve the public in
the best possible way. If this does not result, it is simply too bad for
KLM and the public. It would be a pity for international civil
aviation if it is true that the existence in practically every state of
national airlines operating international air services would make
it understandable, as Mr. Diamond states, that "the constituency for
my purely international approach is as small as it is." On the
contrary, it should be clear to everyone that the very fact of the
existence of the many national airlines makes an international
approach a "must", if we want to avoid a permanent cold war in
the air.'
Mr. Diamond, however, apparently accepts both this cold war,
as it, indeed, is presently being waged," and the possibility that it
will further escalate. Should we accept that "internationalism" finds
only lip-service and no real support? The answer is no, because it
cannot be denied that the alternative, i.e., present-day "bilateralism" in the exchange of air traffic rights, promotes sectarianism
and aggravates discord. For example, states with a large home
market tend to adopt the view in bilateral air negotiations that
their carriers' share of the international air traffic market, and
every national air carrier's share for that matter, should correspond
to the size of their "own" market, and direct their efforts to this
end."2 States with more than one main international airport tend,
in bilateral negotiations, to adopt the gateway system in granting
routes. This posture is pursued to reserve the domestic sector of
'Other examples are Lebanon, Scandinavia, et. al.
'Diamond, supra note 1, at 471.

"Cf. the new United States Policy Statement: "We recognize that international transportation presents special challenges-the most obvious being the need
to cooperate with other sovereign nations." (p.2).
" E.g., the denunciation of the Bermuda agreement between the United States

and the United Kingdom by the United Kingdom on June 22, 1976.
12 Cf. the "Fly-US-Flag" program.
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the transportation of international traffic as much as possible to
their own carriers and direct more traffic to the international services of their own carriers. On the other hand, states with carriers
operating long-haul routes may defend the fifth freedom,13 but
states with a less-developed airline industry will tend to be protectionist to minimize competition. States with a holiday market
tend to promote charter traffic to their territory, as the cheap charter fares can bring more tourists. States which are centrally located
defend the sixth freedom ' for everybody [the (fortunate) accident
of geography]. States with mainly a terminal market or located
at the periphery of the international air traffic market, i.e., with
only end-to-end traffic, may turn to traffic- or tariff-discriminatory
measures in order to channel the traffic to and from their country
on third and fourth freedom carriers' services. This cuts out fifth
freedom carriers and transfer traffic, for example, via intermediate
points other than the furthest points served by their own carrier(s).
States not interested in serving, or not serving to the same extent,
the country of the airline of the other party may turn to the levying
of royalies or may restrict, or even flatly refuse to exchange, traffic
rights if they cannot obtain satisfactory reciprocity. States wishing
to strengthen their relations with any particular country for political, military or other reasons may depart from all principles in
granting traffic rights to that particular country. It is, therefore,
obvious that present-day "bilateralism" in the exchange of air traffic
rights is destructive to effective international air transportation.
The absence of an agreed international approach to international
civil aviation regulation leads states to an opportunistic use of
power to serve their own particular aviation interests on short term.
It has hopefully been predicted that bilateralism may further develop into regionalism when groups of states decide that they can
serve their interests better collectively than individually. This,
however, will only aggravate the problem under the present trends
in air policy: the cold war will be waged between bigger entities.
IlThe fifth freedom is the right to carry traffic between third countries en

route.
"The sixth freedom refers to the carriage of traffic between third countries
via the homeland of the carrier carrying the traffic. As such it combines fourth
freedom carriage (from a third country to the home country of the carrier) and
third freedom carriage (from the home country of the carrier to a third country)

without a break of journey in the home country of the carrier.
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Practicing bilateralism in this way promotes an "everyone for himself" situation. Bilateralism or regionalism, which so far has been
the only feasible mode to build an international air transportation
system by the common effort of all states together on behalf of the
travelling and shipping public at large, can very well be used to
maintain and further develop an integrated world-wide regulatory
framework for civil aviation. This will occur only if states are
willing to move away from the gradually accepted principle of the
"closed sky" by virtue of their national sovereignty, to an "open
sky" in virtue of their common interest in establishing and participating in a world-wide international air services system. Such
"open sky" should be closely defined by the basic requirements of
such world-wide air services system.
To give a hypothetical example of one of these basic requirements: if the London-New York service of British Airways happens to be used by the public from countries other than the United
States and the United Kingdom, travelling or shipping first to
London or, as the case may be, New York, the traffic transferring
there to the London-New York-London service, the United States
government should not try to prevent such use under the United
States-United Kingdom bilateral air agreement by imposing tariff,
frequency or capacity restrictions on the services over that route.
To do so would break up the system of world-wide air transportation facilities which can be made available to the public at large
and which this public apparently chooses to make use of.15 Equally,
the United Kingdom, in our example, should not prevent the
scheduling by PanAm of capacity required to carry traffic to the
United Kingdom coming from, for example, Mexico or Canada
and travelling or shipping via New York on PanAm's services to
London. Nor should, in our example, Mexico indirectly prevent
PanAm from carrying traffic originating in Mexico on its New
York-London services.
It is true, however, that bilateralism does prevent PanAm from
operating directly between Mexico City and London and may prevent PanAm from scheduling one-plane-through-services with a
1 Cf. Recommendation on Government intervention in fares and rates on
international scheduled services, ECAC/9, Triennial Session (1976): "2) should
particularly avoid interventions that would cause a limitation of travel and shipping opportunities etc."
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single flight number from Mexico City via New York to London,
just as it does prevent British Airways from scheduling direct services between, for example, Rome and New York and maybe oneplane-through-services with one and the same flight number between Rome and New York via London. For bilateralism to create
an integrated world-wide air services system in the interest of the
public at large, it is, therefore, indispensable for the states to agree
upon the multilateral significance of bilaterally exchanged routes
and traffic rights so that the air policy of the states does not deprive
the public in third country markets of bilaterally agreed transportation facilities.
The multilateral significance of international air services for the
public at large is recognized in the IATA fares and rate setting
machinery. Departure by individual governments from a multilateral system to establish tariffs, whether by government order
setting unilateral tariffs or by bilateral agreement setting tariffs for
use by their own carriers or even by the third and fourth freedom
carriers only, leads to a segregation of part of the market from
the overall air traffic market by anti-competitive and discriminatory
means. This segregation places international civil aviation and the
travelling and shipping public at the mercy of the power play between the states."' States, therefore, in their air policy, should give
as a first requirement, priority to the development of the entire
international air transportation market over their own particular
short-term national interests in promoting traffic in bilateral markets of their own carriers by artificial means.'
There may be good reasons for a state to impose certain temporary restrictions on foreign air carrier operations. One example
would be to establish its own carriers in the market. These, however, should not become the rule as is the case today. The breakdown of the international air transport regulatory framework which
"See ECAC Recommendation, supra note 15: "1) should continue to promote the establishment of fares and rates for international scheduled air services
by the airline industry itself, and should exercise caution when intervening in

fares and rates so as not to undermine the multilateral structure of fares and
rates."
17See

CIVIL

AERONAUTICS

BOARD,

REGULATORY

REFORM:

REPORT

OF

THE

CAB SPECIAL STAFF, where it is stated that an undesirable effect of regulation is
that "the user, as well as the overall economy, is (similarly) paying for inefficiencies . . . resulting from Government policies designed to . . . artificially
determine the market share of particular airlines through protective regulation."
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resulted during the past decade has led the ICAO Assembly to
convene a Special Air Transport Conference in April 1977. On
the agenda of this Conference are the very problems of the regulation of capacity, the distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled services and the tariffs and their enforcement. For the
United States, wishing to continue its leadership role in the development of civil aviation, it will be of the utmost importance
what the majority of the states will decide in these matters. To
accept the reality of the escalating cold war in the air under a system of "pure bilateralism" may mark the end of international
rapprochement.
Pure bilateralism means the end of the public's freedom to ship
and travel by air world-wide according to its own choice. Nevertheless, such bilateralism may be found by the developing states
to be in their short term aviation interests as a protection against
the big aviation powers which promote their "own traffic" doctrine:
the developing states could hold down capacity to the level of their
own operations to prevent their carriers from being swamped by
foreign capacity. The Bermuda principles of 1946 were a compromise between two opposing philosophies and realities. A new
compromise will have to be found. The realities and philosophies
of today, thirty years after Bermuda, however, have drastically
changed.
The legal concept of sovereignty formally has undergone little
change, notwithstanding the great technological developments
which have shrunk the world. But in practice, states increasingly
assert their sovereignty and act as if they are islands in themselves,
where they should recognize their growing interdependence. 8 The
rule of non-interference in the national affairs of another state is
a rule of international law. Interference over the objections of the
state concerned violates the latter's sovereignty, and can be legally
opposed by that state with all reasonable means available. But, on
the other hand, states by virtue of their power, can and increasingly
do interfere in the course of things in the international sphere.
"The

new United States Policy Statement was issued without prior consul-

tation with other interested nations, although President Ford, in his endorsement
of the Statement, states that: "Historically, the United States has had a leadership

role in the development of international air transportation and intends to continue that role." The implementation of the new policy statement will depend
upon the cooperation of other sovereign nations.
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Such interference can only be opposed by power. This means that
basically a regime of nonfreedom exists in respect of the international activities of man.
To obtain freedom in the international sphere, bilateral or multilateral negotiations are necessary. The freedom which results is a
freedom by contract, in our case, the bilateral or multilateral air
agreement as far as the actual operation of international air services is concerned."
Today, there are no binding international rules in respect of
the contents of such bilateral or multilateral air agreements. By
international custom the Bermuda principles used to constitute
such rules for bilateral air agreements. They no longer apply as to
new bilateral air agreements, and in practice not even in respect of
existing bilateral air agreements if one party feels that its interests
are no longer served by the agreement in the best possible way,
and it has the power to impose its different views."
It will be the task of the Special ICAO Conference to try to
formulate clear international rules in this field and reconfirm, or,
as the case may be, amend the Bermuda principles. In the international field states have the choice to work together in the longterm interest of all concerned, or to try and defend their own particular short-term interests by making use of their near-absolute
sovereignty or their power.
For international civil aviation the choice is to either subject
every activity in the international field to the prior consent of the
state(s) concerned, or to adopt clear international principles for
the international air transportation system in the common interest
of all states and the public at large.
As to the regulation of capacity and tariffs in international civil
aviation, the time may have come to try to formally amend or even
replace the Bermuda principles ("ex post facto" capacity review
and adherence to multilaterally established tariffs as agreed upon
1'Multilateral air agreements are, for instance, the International Air Services
Transit Agreement of Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. 487, and the multi-

lateral agreement on commercial rights of non-scheduled air services in Europe,
Paris, April 30, 1956.
'00Cf. the United

Kingdom decision to unilaterally impose frequency reductions on United States carriers operating in the Miami-London and the ChicagoLondon markets as from Nov. 1, 1976. See, e.g., 226 AVIATION DAILY 250, 332
(1976).
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in IATA) by more "modem" principles. At the same time an
answer will have to be found to the question of the "schedulized"
charter competition which threatens the economic viability of the
scheduled air services system. If there is no longer room for an
idealistic approach, the starting points for a new pragmatic international regime will have to be:
A. the safeguarding of a share of the international air traffic
market for each of the states;2 1 and
B. the maintainance of sufficient competition to protect the interests of the travelling and shipping public."'
On the basis of these two prerequisites, a new regime for international air transportation might be agreed upon enabling both the
scheduled and non-scheduled air carriers to maintain an economically sound world-wide network of international air transportation
services, while offering the public the widest possible choice of
service (quantity, variety, quality, price).
The situation in practice today is that the Bermuda principles
have been abandoned to a point that the scheduled air traffic
market has been carved up between states; the most protectionist
states determining the level of services in bilateral air relationships,
leaving hardly any room for free competition, except, up till now,
on a number of routes between the United States and certain
foreign countries (e.g., the North Atlantic route). Shares of the
market have been indirectly apportioned to the respective national
air carriers by means of route, frequency capacity and traffic restrictions and also, with increasing frequency, by tariff restrictions. " If a carrier feels that it does not obtain its "legitimate"
share of the market or does not operate its authorized services, it
may try to "sell" the unused part to the national carrier of the
other country by requiring the conclusion of a pool agreement, the
payment of royalties, the conclusion of an advantageous commercial agreement or otherwise.
This "balanced" situation leaves no room for competition, not
21 Having a national airline is felt to be part of the international identity of
a State.
21The alternative would be to regard and treat international civil aviation as
an international public utility, abandoning the individual profit motive and having
international air services operated and financed by the States together.
" 2Moreover any anti-competitive practices could be mentioned, e.g., the
monopolization of the distribution system (control of agents).
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even price competition." Price competition would serve no purpose under restrictive conditions, since every other carrier, through
capacity or other arrangements, obtains its "legitimate" share of
the market and naturally wants to do so at the highest possible
price."2 Under such conditions market growth cannot be optimal.
In other words, such a system tends to promote undercapacity and
high tariffs."
The charter revolution, however, introduced price competition
and led to an oversupply of services, especially on the North
Atlantic routes." The United States reacted by trying to even more
strictly define and enforce its national air carriers' entitlement
to the international scheduled air traffic market on the basis of a
state's "own" traffic. To this end, a definition of "scheduled traffic"
had to be found. To separate scheduled traffic from charter traffic,
the distinction was sought by some in allocating individual business travel to scheduled services and group tourist travel to charter
services. 8 They agreed that scheduled services should be restricted
to the capacity which would be essential to cater to the individual
traveller. Such essential scheduled air services should be divided
between the scheduled air carriers on the basis of the "own" traffic
doctrine and be protected by the governments. Free competition
could then be allowed as between scheduled and charter carriers for
the group travel market. A few facts of air transportation life may
show the fallacy of this United States-inspired scheme, as it would
lead, apart from the adverse consequences for the entire interna24 Price competition between scheduled
carriers has been avoided through
multilateral price-fixing under IATA-rules to prevent cut-rate competition, given
more liberal operating conditions. The charter competition has upset this machinery on the North Atlantic and the Europe-South East Asia routes.
25This reasoning underlies the criticism of IATA being a cartel. IATA, as a
multilateral carrier organization, serves a purpose under liberal operating conditions, but loses its "raison d'8tre" and thereby its credibility under a system of
strict bilateral capacity regulation.
26 In the United States, the air carriers had to accept rate regulation in return
for entry control by the CAB under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
21The charter revolution had its main impact on the Europe-Far Eastern
route, because of the "exempt" charter operated by BCAL to Singapore, and
on the North Atlantic route.
2z The new United States Policy Statement makes a distinction between "departure time-sensitive" and "price-sensitive" international air passengers, the first
category relying primarily upon scheduled air service available at short notice,
while the second category will and is able to accept advance purchase requirements.
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tional air transportation industry, to the virtual elimination of
the participation of the smaller countries in scheduled international air transportation:
A. the scheduled air traffic market, in terms of individual business travellers of the smaller countries, is insufficient to support economically viable scheduled air carriers operations;
B. charter air carriers have a distinct (lower cost/lower fare)
advantage over scheduled air carriers in the competition for
the group travel market;
C. to obtain an equal share of the charter air transportation
market is very difficult for a carrier whose home base is not
in the country where the traffic originates (because of a
bigger hold of the middlemen, for example).
In respect of international charter operations, the United States,
moreover, invented the so-called three to four uplift ratio, requiring
foreign charter carriers to operate three charter flights to the United
States for every four charter flights allowed to be operated for the
carriage of traffic originating in the United States. Also, the United
States would bilaterally restrict the operating rights for charter
services to traffic originating in or destined for the territory of the
carrier's home land, including traffic making a stopover of not
less than two nights in the home land of the carrier.'
In the new United States International Air Transportation Policy
Statement of September 8, 1976, it is true, these policies in respect
of essential levels of scheduled service and the uplift ratio are not
repeated in so many words. The statement, however, leaves ample
room for much restrictive implementation. In that case, countries
with a smaller volume of traffic originating therein will have to find
an answer to these restrictive theories and practices leading to the
silent capture of the international air traffic market by the bigger
states. To this end, a certain minimum participation of every state
29

Charter-only carriers operate mainly on dense routes at high load factors.

Moreover, as a rule, their overhead cost is lower than that of scheduled air carriers. A cost advantage of scheduled carriers may be their higher aircraft utilization and the possibility to use idle aircraft hours for charter operations. This,
however, will not allow large scale charter operations in competition with charter-

only carriers. The new United States Policy Statement, therefore, calls for part
charters to be allowed (p. 12).
30Agreement with the United Kingdom on Air Charter Services, April 28,
1976, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. _.
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in international air transportation should be guaranteed while
next to this an area of free competition, open to all air carriers
having a "natural access" to the traffic concerned, should be established in the interest of the travelling and shipping public.31
I will outline a possible new system for the regulation of inter-

national air transportation to amend and thereby at least partly revive the unfortunately deceased Bermuda principles. If we accept
a state's entitlement to the carriage by its national air carrier(s)
of a share of the international traffic, we shall have to define the
traffic to which a state is entitled. For this purpose and in view of
the above, it is suggested that this traffic should be defined by the
"natural access" which a carrier, in the absence of restrictions, has
to the traffic." This would be, in the first place, the traffic which
embarks or disembarks in the home country of the carrier, regardless of its origin or destination. Such traffic constitutes the justification of the services of the carrier concerned and therefore should
be taken as a basis for regulatory purposes. It will provide an opportunity and an incentive for carriers to increase the volume of

traffic embarking or disembarking in its home country, without the
restraints of a predetermination of routes on a bilateral basis, point-

to-point tariff restrictions, tariff discriminatory measures or sixth
freedom traffic restrictions.' Furthermore, on services being operated by a carrier for the traffic embarking and disembarking in its
"'Cf. S. WHEATCROFT AIR TRANSPORT POLICY 73-74 (1964) where he states
that "liberal" countries may accept a share of forty per cent of the traffic. He
concludes: "The difference between liberal and protectionist policies may (therefore) be thought of as a willingness, on the one hand to compete for 20% of the
total market, compared with an insistence upon a 50/50 division of traffic on the
other."
s In the new United States Policy Statement a different criterion is mentioned:
" . to select routes that closely reflect natural traffic patterns and are economically viable." (p. 2). It should be noted that a traffic pattern develops as a
result of services offered, and that, dependent on the acceptance of the public
of such services, the economic viability of the operations is determined.
33
A major inconsistency in the new United States Policy Statement is the
objective of "reliance on competitive market forces to the greatest extent feasible" (p. 8) next to the statement that where carriers rely excessively on sixth
freedom traffic this has "severely distorted traffic levels and distribution in certain
markets" (p. 20). Does the United States want to prescribe transportation on
United States carriers' services where the public chooses to make use of foreign
carriers' services in sixth freedom? To what extent can the public make use of
sixth freedom transportation possibilities before it becomes excessive for the
carrier to accommodate the public in this way?

1976]

AIR TRANSPORT CONFERENCE

home land, the carrier should be entitled to serve a number of
foreign points on one and the same service if geography, economy
and operational convenience permit. In such cases the carrier would
obtain a natural access to the traffic moving between such foreign
points and should obtain the right to embark and disembark traffic
in fifth freedom in the intermediate point(s).
It may be seen that under this system there will always be at
least two national carriers and, in the case of the fifth freedom, an
undefined number of third country carriers which have a "natural
access" to the same traffic. The question then arises who will be
entitled to carry which percentage of that traffic at which frequency
and with which capacity (type of aircraft) and along which route
(on end-to-end services, or on services via intermediate points or
on transit services to points beyond, or on connecting services).
To answer this question I should like to, first of all, use four "imperatives" for governments to implement the "natural access"
criterion: the operational, the geographic, the economic and the
social imperative. The operational imperative is determined by the
characteristics of the aircraft in the widest sense and the available
airport and air navigational facilities. States should make it operationally possible for air carriers to serve the traffic centers which
can support air services. The geographic imperative is determined
by the location of the traffic centers as such and in relation to each
other. States should allow reasonably direct routings to and from
the homeland of a carrier, combination of services, ' transit services
and services which connect with each other, if justified by geography, including passenger or shipper convenience. The economic
imperative is determined by the requirements of an economically
sound operation of international air services. States should allow
sufficient frequencies and capacity, as well as sufficient traffic rights
at reasonable tariffs, to enable the air carriers to mount an economic operation between traffic centers. It may be necessary to this
end to restrict entry of too many carriers in some markets. Such
restrictions would specify which routes or route sectors may not
be served by a specific carrier or carriers. After taking these three
imperatives into account, the fourth imperative should not be ig"So-called
rights).

blind-sector rights (commingling rights, including co-terminal

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

nored: the social imperative. States should ensure on the one hand
that the public can be served according to its choice and on the
other hand that measures are taken to protect the population and
the environment against the nuisance, damage and hazards which
may result from the operation of aircraft. Of course, such measures
should not discriminate and should not work to the detriment of
international civil aviation development.
The regulatory problem of allocating shares of the international
air traffic market to the scheduled and non-scheduled (charter)
carriers of the respective states should be approached on the basis
and within the framework of these imperatives, while leaving part
of the market open to free competition. Such allocation should
therefore be limited to carriers having a natural access to the carriage of the traffic. Competition between such carriers should be
subject to the rules of fair play only.' As a first rule, no state should
be allowed to protect or claim its share of the traffic to which its
air carriers have a natural access if these carriers do not make an
effort to carry that share in practice, or are unable or unfit to do so.
The justification of the operation of routes and the provision of
capacity for traffic to and from a carrier's homeland should be
found, in the case of scheduled operations, in a minimum average
loadfactor on each sector of the route' of not lower than say fifty
percent, achieved over a minimum period of one year."'
In the case of non-scheduled operations the yardstick should be,
next to a higher loadfactor requirement at specified minimum charter prices, the profitability of the individual flight or the programmed operation ("schedulized" charter flights). For the determination of the shares, one should not strictly divide, as has been
unreflectingly suggested by some, only the scheduled operations
as between states 8 and leave charter services to compete freely
among themselves and with scheduled air services. To do so would
reduced the scheduled air services as far as they could then be eco' Under such a system IATA could regain its indispensibility.
"At each intermediate point a certain amount of fifth freedom should be
granted as long as the transit traffic will be more, as an average, than the traffic

embarking at the intermediate point concerned.
87 See also note 29 supra.
8

1 As has been argued, it is extremely difficult to find an adequate definition

of "scheduled service" or "scheduled traffic."
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nomically operated, to an unacceptable level, even if scheduled
services' shares would be protected by the governments. The essential level of scheduled air services, and certainly the level of
essential scheduled air services which would remain, if charter air
services were allowed to compete freely for the traffic which is not
bound to travel or be shipped on scheduled services and which
could just as well make use of charter service (and will do so if the
price is more advantageous), would in many cases be too low to be
economically justified and would no longer be adequate to satisfy
public demand for readily available scheduled service. On the North
Atlantic route, for instance, often more than seventy percent of the
traffic on scheduled services comes under this category.
The conclusion, therefore, must be that, if we want to determine
shares of the traffic to which states will be entitled, no distinction
must be made between programmed charter service and scheduled
service or alternately that charter service should be bound to minimum tariffs to ensure honest competition with scheduled services.
In the latter case the question would be asked what the use of
charter service would be. On the other hand the question may be
asked what the use of scheduled services is, if a great part of the
traffic can be carried cheaper on charter services. I feel that once
shares have been allocated, the question whether traffic should be
carried on scheduled services, charter services or on both, should
be left to the decision of the states concerned, on the understanding
that in this case multilateral agreement exists in respect of charterworthiness criteria to prevent diversion of traffic from one country
to another. Traffic to which the carrier(s) of a state have a natural
access may be carried on charter flights or on scheduled services or
on both, depending on the decision of the states involved and on
agreement between them, as long as their "legitimate" share of the
traffic is safeguarded. How can this be achieved?
States with a large traffic-originating market are inclined to solve
the charter problem by suggesting that the rules of the country of
origin should prevail, so that the state of origin will be free to determine how "its" traffic is to be carried.' In my opinion, however,
3' Under such a system, the determination of the "legitimate share" would

still be based on the origin of the traffic. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
new United States Policy Statement of September 8, 1976, reaffirms that the
United States will continue to advocate the "country of origin" concept (p. 13).
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no such priority could be given to the state in which the greater
part of the traffic between two points originated. After all, the state
attracting the traffic may have a greater interest in the provision or
at least the availability of adequate service to its territory. It is true
that the state in which the greater part of the traffic originated grants
more export opportunities than it receives when exchanging tariff
rights, but this cannot be an argument to claim the greater part
of the capacity to be provided, nor to apply its rules unilaterally.0
The opposite result could hold back the development of the traffic
in case the state receiving the traffic wants more service (and is
willing and able to provide it) than the state in which the traffic
originated is prepared to allow.' Application of the rules of the
country of origin of the charter traffic, therefore, cannot guarantee
an optimum development of the market nor provide a just basis for
the ultimate determination of the "legitimate" shares of the states
in the carriage of international air traffic."
We will have to approach the problem from a bilateral, or better
still, multilateral or at least plurilateral standpoint. The traffic to
which a state has a natural access can be divided into on-line
traffic moving over routes to and from the homeland of its carriers
and in fifth freedom en route, and non-scheduled (charter) traffic
between any points where its carriers can offer a competitive
product on a profitable basis. The share to which each state is entitled and which could receive protection, in respect of such on-line
traffic could be established at forty percent as far as the traffic to
and from the homeland of the carrier is concerned. This share can
be obtained on both scheduled and charter services." As far as
40

The European countries, organized in the European Civil Aviation Conference, have consistently refused to formally accept the country of origin concept.
41The United States may find that it has an interest in having a say in the
European rules governing charter operations in order to attract more tourists from
Europe to the United States on charter flights.
' The new United States Policy Statement 'justifies' the application of country
of origin rules by stating that it cannot be expected that complete international
commonality can be achieved and each country should be enabled to adopt those
requirements that meet its 'unique' needs. (p. 13). In my opinion each country's
unique needs call for international multilateral agreement in respect of the regulation of international 'scheduled' charter operations.
On-line traffic is traffic moving between points chosen by the carrier to be
served with scheduled air services, such carrier having a natural access to the
traffic concerned.
"Criteria for a definition of "scheduled air service" or "scheduled air trans-
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on-line fifth freedom traffic en route and off-line traffic is concerned,
the share should be determined in free competition in respect of
traffic to which the carrier has a natural access. In the case of online fifth freedom traffic this could go up to twenty percent of the
traffic on the sector concerned.
Off-line traffic by definition will be charter traffic, or at least
non-scheduled traffic.' This system would mean that a carrier having a natural access to the traffic on a route thus specified would
have a protected on-line entitlement to forty percent of its homeland traffic (third, fourth and sixth freedom traffic), while it would
have the possibility to obtain up to twenty percent of the traffic on
fifth freedom sectors en route in free competition. To obtain this
share, and even more in case other "natural-access-carriers" do not
take up their share of the on-line traffic, the carrier should maintain
a reasonable loadfactor or profitable charter service and quote
agreed tariffs. The natural access criterion and the forty/forty/
twenty percent determination of on-line shares will automatically
limit entry of too many carriers into the same international market
on the same route.
Any structure of international air services requires a tariff policy
geared to the regulatory system in respect of route patterns and capacity. In my system non-discriminatory price competition could
be allowed to a certain extent, if this would help to further develop
the market on an economic basis.' The transition to a more competitive market" between carriers having a natural access to the
traffic for which they would be allowed to compete would benefit
portation" vary. Published flight schedules, specifying the times, days of the week
and places between which such flights are performed, or alternatively a recog-

nizable pattern of services (systematic series of flights) open to the general public
seem required, in all cases, although it is uncertain whether the flights have to be
performed in that way during a minimum period of time.
I Off-line traffic is traffic between points or areas which are not being served
by scheduled services of a carrier which has a natural access to the traffic
concerned.
The recently introduced low point-to-point, one-flight coupon fares (super-

apex fares between Canada and Europe) on scheduled services, by not allowing
transfers, are incompatible with the "natural access" criterion, as they indirectly
influence travel patterns by making third and fourth freedom transportation
cheaper than transfer-travel, such as sixth freedom transportation.
47 Cf. the CAB Regulatory Reform Bill presented to the U.S. Senate in early
June, 1976, which, however, would involve a system of part regulation, deregulating charter and all-cargo transportation only. S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976). See generally, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 573-883 (1975).
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the travelling and shipping public, provided rules of honest competition can be enforced. This task should be left to the airline
industry with the possibility of assistance on the part of the aeronautical authorities if needed."' The shares should be assessed bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally after each of two one year
scheduling periods, and adjustments in schedules and capacity
could be agreed, if necessary, to enter into force as from the second
scheduling period thereafter.
No predetermination of routes, schedules and capacity on the
basis of traffic forecasts should be allowed as this would affect
traffic development. Such artificial restraints affect carrier efficiency
and reduce the flexibility required to respond to and stimulate
traffic demand.
In a growing market the carrier, not having obtained its "legitimate" share of the market, should have first priority to increase its
on-line capacity, including the inauguration of new scheduled
routes. No reduction of capacity should be required if a carrier
obtains a satisfactory loadfactor or operates profitable charter services. Such reduction would punish the carrier for its efficiency and
victimize the public making use of these services. If a state, however, exceeds its share of the traffic by the operation of charter
services, a reduction of the on-line charter operations could be
envisaged, if required by a state to enable its carrier(s) to obtain
its legitimate share.
The indiscriminate cries for ever stricter capacity regulation in
international air transportation on the one hand, and deregulation
within the United States on the other hand, should be replaced by
constructive study of the many financial, economic, social and political aspects of the problem.' It is hoped that the above comments
may contribute to further deliberation of the matter and possibly
some positive results of the coming Special ICAO-Conference.
41Governments, in order to prevent predatory pricing, should disapprove
fares and rates below the direct costs of providing the service in question, taking
the fifty per cent load-factor standard as a basis to compute the direct costs
per seat kilometer and ton kilometer. Revenue requirements (rate of return on
investments) could then be left to measures to be taken by the carriers, designed
to lead in practice to loadfactors, exceeding the standard loadfactor.
4 Cf. Address by Hammarskjold, the Wings Club in New York City, March

10, 1976, and, for US domestic air transportation, the US Administration's deregulation bill S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See 41 J.

573-883 (1975).
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